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 “Violence breeds violence … Pure goals can never justify impure or violent action … 
They say the means are after all just means. I would say means are after all 
everything. As the means, so the end … If we take care of the means we are bound of 
reach the end sooner or later.” 
 





















One of the most important raison d‟être of International Law is the respect towards 
civilian persons and objects and the protection against the effects of war. Article 48 of 
Additional Protocol I (from now on ADI) to the Geneva Conventions enshrines a basic rule, 
requiring that parties to an armed conflict distinguish between civilian persons and objects on 
one side, and combatants and military on the other side, and most importantly, that attacks are 
directed only against military objectives. 
Several concrete obligations can be assumed from this general Principle of (from now 
on PD), such as the prohibition of direct attacks against civilian persons and objects
1
, as well 
as acts of violence which primary purpose is to terrorize civilian population.
2
 Indiscriminate 
attacks are also forbidden. In other words, attacks that are not or cannot be directed at a 
specific military objective, or attacks whose desired effects can‟t be limited as International 
Humanitarian Law (from now on IHL) requires.
3
 
Still, it is legally accepted that in war scenarios, civilian persons and objects may incidentally 
be affected by attacks which targeted legitimate military objectives in the first place. These 
realities are referred to as “collateral causalities” or collateral damage”,
4
 civilians may be 
victims of wrong target identification as well as of unintended but inevitable side effects of an 
attack directed at a legitimate target, in their neighborhood. Following the Principle of 
Proportionality, these collateral causalities and damages are lawful under treaty and 




Apart from all this, also in the case that a lawful attack is launched, even then, 
precautionary measures are in order from both sides of the conflict, so that collateral effects 
of the hostilities on civilian persons, civilian population and objects are avoided or at least 
                                                        
1 The fact that, in principle, civilian and other protected persons or objects may not be attacked does 
not preclude this legal protection from ceasing under exceptional circumstances. 
2
 See, in particular, Articles 51(2) and 52(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. 
3
 Article 51(4) Additional Protocol I. 
4
 „„Collateral casualties‟‟ and „„collateral damage‟‟ are defined in Rule 13(c) of the San Remo Manual 
on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea as „„the loss of life of, or injury to, civilians 
or other protected persons, and damage to or the destruction of the natural environment or objects that 
are not in themselves military objectives‟‟. 
5
 The Principle of Proportionality (Article 51/5, b of Additional Protocol I) possesses in it more than 
the obligation to take precautions in attack. It is, however, relevant at this point, as demonstrated by 
Article 57/2, a, iii. (see in this respect Cannizzaro, Enzo; Contextualising proportionality: ius ad 
bellum and ius in bello in the Lebanese war; p. 779-792). 




minimized as stated by Luis Moreno Ocampo: “Under IHL and the Rome Statute, the death of 
civilians during an armed conflict, no matter how grave and regrettable, does not in itself 
constitute a war crime. IHL and the Rome Statute permit belligerents to carry out 
proportionate attacks against military objectives, even when it is known that some civilian 
deaths or injuries will occur. A crime occurs if there is an intentional attack directed against 
civilians (PD) (Article 8(2)(b)(i)) or an attack is launched on a military objective in the 
knowledge that the incidental civilian injuries would be clearly excessive in relation to the 
anticipated military advantage (Principle of Proportionality, Article 8(2)(b)(iv)).”
6
 
This work will focus on the precautionary measures demanded from the belligerent 
before engaging in attack as well as during the conduction of the attack, resulting from what 
is predicted in ADI.
7
 Furthermore, we will try to demonstrate that this body of laws is not 
simply a set of rules asking for good ethical and moral behavior, but instead constitute 
mandatory standards of conduct. As a conclusion to our theoretical analysis of the rules, we 
will proceed to an analysis of one of the most modern trends in IHL, the use of robots in the 
field of battle, more specifically unmanned aerial vehicle (Drones) and its compliance with 






                                                        




 In agreement with the target of application of Additional Protocol I present in Article 49/3, our work 
will refer just to the protection of civilian persons and objects on land, excluding precautions required 
in naval or air warfare (to which Article 57/4 of Additional Protocol I refers, indicating that „„In the 
conduct of military operations at sea or in the air, each Party to the conflict shall … take all reasonable 
precautions to avoid losses of civilian lives and damage to civilian objects.‟‟ 






1. Conduct of Hostilities and the Principles of International 
Humanitarian Law 
 
1.1 The Principle of Necessity 
 
The Principle of Necessity was defined in article 14 of the Lieber Code, as those 
measures without which a military endeavor cannot be reached, and that are legal according 
to modern law and uses of war. Nowadays, the concept of military necessity is a result of the 
several elements. First, the use of force is predicted by law and not arbitrary; second it‟s what 
allows achieving the fastest total or partial submission of the enemy; third, it does not exceed 
what is needed to achieve that target (limitation).
8
 
So, military necessity is regulated by several rules: as stated above, any attack or 
action must intend to help in the military defeat of the enemy; the objective/aim to be fulfilled 
by the attack must be a military one, and the harm caused to civilians or civilian property 







                                                        
8  Rogers, Anthony P. V.; Law on the Battlefield; Melland Schill Studies in International Law, 
Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 1996, p. 3. 
9
 It is the opinion of part of the doctrine that the Principle of Necessity is a subprinciple of the Principle 
of Proportionality. As stated by the European Union court of justice, “in order to ascertain whether a 
provision of community law is consistent with the Principle of Proportionality, it must first be 
determined whether the means applied weather the means applied to achieve its aim correspond to the 
importance of that aim and, secondly, whether they are necessary in order to achieve it”  in Office 
belge de l‟économie et de agriculture (OBEA) v SA Nicolas Corman et fils, Case 125/83, Judgement of 
1 October 1985, para. 36. In International Law the distinction between both principles exists, and that 
is why, the United States, relating the measures adopted against Afghanistan and Sudan, which were 
qualified as self defense, in its notification to the security council of the United Nations of August 
1998, stated that “The targets struck, and the timing and method of attack used, were carefully 
designed to minimize risks of collateral damage to civilians and to comply with international law, 
including the rules of necessity and proportionality”, in UN Doc. S/1998/780, 20 August 1998. 




1.2 The Principle of Distinction 
 
The Principle of Distinction is one of the most important rules of IHL, having the 
responsibility of avoiding or at least reducing nasty consequences of war for the civilian 
population. In order to avoid the most dramatic consequences for civilians, it is of the utmost 
importance that combatants distinguish themselves from civilians. That is why, as the US 
Supreme Court stated in Ex Parte Quirin, “by universal agreement and practice the laws of 




As we know, military attacks can only target military objectives and never be directed to 
civilian targets, therefor, in accordance to a basic principle of customary IHL, parties to an 
armed conflict are obliged to draw a clear line between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives. In order to spare civilians 
and the civilian population from hostilities and their effects, it is essential to define who and 
what may be attacked. The first rule regarding attacks (by acts of violence) is that the 
intended target must be a military objective. When the target is military objective, under 
additional rules, the attack may nevertheless become illegal if excessive collateral damage 
affecting civilians or civilian objects are to be expected. Furthermore, even when attacking a 
lawful target, precautionary measures to spare civilians have to be taken. While the main aim 
of the law is to protect persons, it is appropriate to discuss first what and who may be 
attacked. This permits to clarify the criteria, which make targets legitimate. 
 The distinction between combatants and civilians first appeared in the St. Petersburg 
Declaration, stating that “the only legitimate object which Stated should endeavor to 
accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy”.
11
 This principle is now 
codified in Articles 48, 51/2 and 52/2 of ADI. As predicted by the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, “intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or 




 In their pleadings before the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear 
                                                        
10
 US Supreme Court , Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) at 31. Cf. Also General Assembly resolution 
2765(XXV) relating “Basic  Principles for the Protection of the Civilian Populations in Armed 
Conflicts”. 
11
 Preamble of St. Petersburg Declaration, 1868. 
12
 Article 8/2, b, i,  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 




Weapons case, several States invoked the PD.  In its advisory opinion in the Nuclear 
Weapons case, the Court stated that the PD was one of the “cardinal principles” of IHL and 
one of the “intransgressible principles of international customary law”.
13
 
When the International Committee of the Red Cross (from now on ICRC) appealed to the 
parties to the conflict in the Middle East in October 1973, meaning, before the adoption of 
ADI, to respect the distinction between combatants and civilians, the States concerned 
























                                                        
13 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1. C.J. Reports 1996, p. 257. 
14
 See ICRC, Customary IHL Database, (https://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule1#refFn_90_17) 




1.3 The Principle of Precaution 
 
This Principle is the object of this work, therefore, it shall be explained and discussed 
further ahead.  
Humanity is a guiding principle that limits actions that might other ways have been justifiable 
under military necessity. Why do we make such a strong, yet simple statement? For a simple 
reason, because some of the existent doctrine relating the set of precautions enumerated in 
Article 57 of ADI affirms that each State is in fact free to organize its national defense, and 




But, we will seek to demonstrate, that the rules forming this principle have developed 
from mere recommendations into mandatory standardized procedures and behaviors that form 
altogether a certain conduct and that are put in practice whenever a decision to attack or not 

















                                                        
15 Deyra, Michael, Direito Internacional Humanitário, Procuradoria-Geral da República, Gabinete de 
Documentação e Direito Comparado, p. 50. 




1.4 The Principle of Proportionality 
 
The Principle of Proportionality seeks the balance between the military necessity and 
humanity. This principle is to be found in Lieber Code and is part of customary IHL, as for 
example in what self-defense relating jus ad bellum is concerned. In practice, what this 
principle stands for is a special attention by the attackers to take all feasible measures in the 
planning of the attack, ensuring the minimum risk possible for civilian populations.  
So, before an attack, a commander should consider the military advantage and the collateral 
damage that will probably result from the attack. The commander has to verify the nature of 
the targets to be attacked, ensuring they are military targets and take all possible precautions 
to avoid collateral damage. If there are several options, he should compare the different attack 
methods and chose the less excessive one which is compatible with the military success. The 
main target of this principle is to protect the civilians that are non-intentionally attacked. Its 
practical application is however very difficult for the concepts that form this principle (such 
as the value of human life and military necessity) are quite subjective. It is indeed 
understandable that in some war situations, deciding if an attack will or will not have an 
excessive damage, might be an extremely complicated task. Especially if we consider that the 












                                                        
16
 For further information, please consult Rodrigues de Freitas, Joana O.; O Princípio da 
Proporcionalidade no Direito dos Conflitos Armados: Utopia ou Regra de Conduta?; in Conflitos 
Armados, Gestão Pós-Conflitual e Reconstrução, Andavira, Santiago de Compostela, 2011, p. 108 ff. 




Chapter 2 – Precautions in attack 
  
§ 1 The birth and evolution of the precautions in attack 
 
The obligation to warn of an upcoming attack in armed conflict situations was 
stipulated in the first treaties on the law of war (so that the civilian population could 
evacuate). However, the general obligation to take precautions in attack was only codified 
quite late.
17
 As a matter of fact, before the ADI was adopted, the opinions stating that the 
obligation also known as “Rule 15”
18
 was binding on every attacker, derived from a broad 
interpretation of the Hague Conventions from 1899 and 1907 as well as the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and customary law. 
The rules concerning precautions in attack in the case of an international armed 
conflict are set out in the Article 57 of API. It is important to keep in mind that Article 57 is 
not the only rule relating the precautions to be observed by an attacker. Although we can see 
this article as the primary source, it‟s important to remember that several treaties relating the 
use of specific means of warfare also rule upon the obligation to take precautionary measures. 
However these rules apply solely preexisting ADI obligations relating specific weapons. 
We will now shortly describe the several different precautions to be observed in 
attack, while trying to give a short explanation on an important characteristic of all these 
precautions, and give some real life examples every now-and-then, which should be a present 
background whenever the discussion is precautions in attack. We will start by referring to the 
“feasible” limitation of these precautions, so that the reader can have a better understanding 






                                                        
17
 The International Committee of the Red Cross stated, in its report preceding the Conference of 
Government Experts of 1971, that the obligation to take precautions in attack „„has been affirmed by 
publicists for a long time, but without being expressed in a very precise manner in the provisions of 
international law in force‟‟. 
18
 Henckaerts, Jean-Marie; Doswald-Beck, Louise; Customary International Humanitarian Law; 
Volume I: Rules, International Committee of the Red Cross, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 51. 




1. Precautions in Conduct of Hostilities 
 
1.1. The ‘‘feasibility’’ of the precautions 
 
The feasibility of the precautions described above is in our opinion a well thought 
way of saying that each party to a conflict has to do everything within their reach to protect 
civilian population and objects. Why was the abstract and hard to explain expression 
“feasible” chosen? We think this expression was chosen precisely for its abstract 
characteristics, for its numerous interpretation possibilities depending on each situation and 
players in it. It is just obvious that a feasible precaution for the United States of America 
armed forces may not be practicable or practically possible for a militia which is the other 
party on a given armed conflict, for certain circumstances, such as, for example, lack of 
highly developed technologic means available. In order to take a precaution, that precaution 
has to be feasible, and this feasibility is analyzed on the basis of humanitarian and military 
considerations. As India explained in its vote on Article 57 of the 1977 ADI: 
“India voted in favour of this article on the clear understanding that it will apply in 
accordance with the limits of capability, practical possibility and feasibility of each Party to 
the conflict. As the capability of Parties to a conflict to make distinction will depend upon the 
means and methods available to each Party generally or in particular situations, this article 
does not require a Party to undertake to do something which is not within its means or 
methods or its capability. In its practical application, a Party would be required to do 
whatever is practical and possible.”
19
 
 So, it is possible to understand that the feasibility of a precaution in attack must be 
interpreted as an indication that the obligation imposed by the text of Article 57, take place 
under the condition or circumstances that allow (or to some extent, do not allow) Articles 57 
precautions to be put in practice, after an analysis of available information, and the absolute 
needs (military necessity) of the belligerents, namely, the success of military operations. The 
duty to take precautions when attacking is not absolute. Belligerents have, however, the 
obligation (legal and moral) to proceed in good faith as too tacking the necessary precautions, 
although people acting in good faith may still make mistakes.
20
 
                                                        
19 India, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR. 42, 27 May 1977, p. 228. 
20
 Fenrick, William J.; Targeting and proportionality during the NATO bombing campaign against 
Yugoslavia; EJIL, Vol. 12, (2001), p. 501. 




1.2. The obligation to take constant care, in the conduct of military operations, in 
order to spare civilian population, civilians, and civilian objects 
  
  
This obligation directly derives from the fundamental PD that we explained before. 
However this first duty is quite abstract, forming a kind of introduction to this article. In 
accordance to the ICRC Commentary on API, the following paragraphs of this article are 
dedicated to “the practical application of this principle”.
21
 So, it is clear that the first 
obligation of Article 57 is meant to build a “bridge” between the general PD and the 
practicalities of the precautions to be taken in attack. 
There is in fact a direct link between Article 57 number 1 and its following paragraphs. 
However, it‟s not right to state that paragraph 1 does not have its unique legal effect. 
Although it makes sense to say, at this point, that in our opinion, it makes perfect sense to 
interpret this duty in conjunction with the more concrete obligations listed in the following 
paragraphs, it does not mean in our opinion, that this is mandatory in order for this abstract 
rule to have legal weight. 
 Examining the chosen words of Article 57 tells us that the target idea or scope of the 
duty from paragraph I is wider than the one present in the subsequent paragraphs. To confirm 
this idea we just need to compare the language used in the second paragraph, which clearly 
states that it applies only in the event of an “attack”,
22
 meaning, an act of violence against the 
enemy, with the more opened idea in the first paragraph, namely “military operations”, which 
may well be the movement of troops, and other military maneuvers, before or in between any 
military combat.
23
 We can therefore conclude that the broader field of application of this first 
rule may well give birth to concrete legal obligations. 
 
                                                        
21
 Commentary on Additional Protocol I (p. 680, para. 2191). As mentioned before, in its study on 
customary international humanitarian law, the ICRC confirms this obligation in Rule 15 (the first rule 
in Chapter 5 devoted to precautions in attack), the commentary states: „„This is a basic rule to which 
more content is given by the specific obligations contained in Rules 16–21‟‟ (Above note 18, p. 51). 
22
 The same logic applies, by analogy, to the third paragraph. 
23
 „„The term „„military operations‟‟ should be understood to mean any movements, maneuvers and 
other activities whatsoever carried out by the armed forces with a view to combat‟‟; Commentary on 
Additional Protocol I (p. 680, para. 2191). This opinion can be contradicted because it could, liberate 
Article 57 from its strict context of precautions in attack, which is clearly stated by the title, being its 
only object. But this doesn‟t mean that we are trying to deny that the link between distinction and 
precautions it the first paragraph. 




1.3. The obligation to verify that the objectives to be attacked are of military 
nature 
 
 This obligation, found in Article 57/2, a, i presents the duty of target verification, 
which is as well an important part of the PD, creating a practical barrier between combatants 
and non-combatants. This rule seeks to ensure the safety of civilian populations and objects 
by requiring from those who plan or decide to attack, to do everything “within their power” 
(feasibility) to make sure that the target to be attacked is one of strictly military nature. 
The obligation to verify the nature of what or who is to be attacked demands technical 
resources with quality, or better said; the better the reconnaissance methods and means, the 
more accurate will the information relating the potential target be.
24
 But the obligation under 
analysis should not, or cannot be interpreted as demanding the belligerents to possess 
sophisticated means of reconnaissance, as many of the parties to the conflicts do not possess 
such modern and sophisticated means, as we well know. 
What this obligation indeed requires is that a commander only decides to engage in attack, 
after the most effective means at their disposal have been used systematically, so that the 
information over which his decision is based, is the most reliable possible, making him 
believe for sure that the nature of the target is a military one. So, seems to be obvious that this 
rule does not set an obligation to deliver a result,
25
 but it demands that in case of uncertainty, 
additional information has to be analyzed before the order of attack is given.
26
 What exactly 
does this mean? This means that an attack being ordered having a simple suspicion as far as 




Besides the above stated, relating the information to be put together before an order to attack 
is given, not only information relating the nature of the objective, but also information such as 
                                                        
24  Quoted by Quéguiner, Jean-François in Precautions under the law governing the conduct of 
hostilities, International review of the Red Cross, December 2006, p. 797 “In accordance to Article 
57/2, a, i, this verification has to take place at the moment of planning or deciding to attack. However, 
if some time has passed between the planning and deciding moment and the beginning of attack, then 
there is an obligation to update and review the information available in order to be sure that no change 
of circumstances has led to a change in the nature of the target (Urbina, Jorge J., Derecho Internacional 
Humanitario, La Corunña, 2000, p. 241)”. 
25
 Above note 24, p.798. “As noted by Yoram Dinstein in, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of 
International Armed Conflict, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 126: „„Palpably, no 
absolute certainty can be guaranteed in the process of ascertaining the military character of an 
objective selected for attack, but there is an obligation of  due diligence and acting in good faith‟‟.” 
26
 Commentary on Additional Protocol I (p. 680, para. 2195). 
27
 Lack of information in these cases cannot be seem as exempting reasons, and it can therefore be 
qualified as war crimes. (Oeter, Stefan; Methods and means of combat;  in Dieter Fleck, The Handbook 
of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 457). 




the near surroundings of the target are of the utmost importance, in order to have a clear 
image of the conditions that will trigger the obligation to apply the Principle of 
Proportionality. And at this point it‟s important to mention, situations where this verifications 
and careful planning cannot take place, due to lack of time to complete demanding attack 
planning procedures; such as the “emerging targets”. In cases such as these, the determination 
of the military nature of the potential target as well as its possible collateral causalities and 
damage, is made according to special procedures based on criteria that is predetermined. The 
fact that these predetermined procedures exist and are put in practice, is directly connected 
with the feasible effort we mentioned before.
28
 It is however known and quite logically, in our 
opinion, that the process of assessing collateral damage works better when relating pre-
planned targets, when compared to the process in relation to emerging targets, often resulting 
in disproportionate bombings, due of course, to the lack of time to conduct effective planning 
and assessment. 
As we know, identifying a potential target and estimating the collateral damage that 
can result of an attack is a complex task, and those who make the final decision will have to 
rely on indirect information which may be provided by reconnaissance (human, satellite, 
airplanes or other) services or intelligence. There are of course several levels of liability in 
this chain of decision-making, and one decides according to the information given by another 
(who has the prior step in the chain), so if let‟s say intelligence passes on information which 
is unreliable or leads to mistakes, then, they shall be held responsible, as the ones who decide 








                                                        
28
 According to Human Rights Watch, in Iraq operations (2003) the United States had two different 
ways of acting, depending on the circumstances: when there was time to conduct a study of the target, 
they followed a careful procedure, planning and assessment. However, when the strike is one of an 
emerging target, having to be carried out as fast as possible, they applied special procedures. 




 1.4. The obligation to avoid, or at least limit, loss or damage to the civilian 
 
This obligation may seem logic-less, as it appears to be a simple practical 
consequence of the Principle of Proportionality. It is also quite easy to consider it a rule 
applying to the war (bombings for example) taking place in densely populated areas, such as 
cities or villages. However there is nothing that indicates such an interpretation to be 
supported in the text of the Article, neither in ICRCs 1987 commentary on this article. So, it 
is in our opinion incorrect to limit the application of this duty to just conflicts taking place in 
densely populated areas, and it should therefore be seen as a rule which demands more than 
just the improvement of accuracy in bombing situations. This is quite easy to understand 
when we think for example in the timings of attack, for this provision can absolutely be 
interpreted as setting a restriction on attack timings, as mentioned in the ICRC Commentary 
on ADI relating the bombing raids from the Allies against the factories located in German 
occupied territories. The attacks were carried out at times when the factories were not 
working, as the idea was to destroy those factories and not killing the people working in them. 
This sets an example of which precautions were thought behind Article 57/2, a, ii, more 
specifically relating the precautions of methods of attack. So the aim of this rule is to spare 
civilian population and objects by choosing an attack timing which limits collateral damage 
as much as possible. 
Of course this rule can also serve as a limitation of the location of attacks, ensuring, when 
possible that densely populated areas are not attacked, when from such an attack heavy 
collateral causalities may result. 
As far as the means of combat are concerned, the rule states that parties to a conflict 
have to use the most precise weapons available (such as precision-guided munitions) when 
there is a possibility of collateral damage resulting from the attack to be carried out. As most 
legal doctrine seems to think, the choice of weapons concerns the belligerent parties, in 
accordance to its military interests. Furthermore, no provision in the Law of Armed Conflicts 
(from now on LAC) sets regulations as to which weapons must be used in a attack of a certain 
target. The law simply says that a balance between unnecessary suffering and military 
necessity should be met so that the concept of proportionality is respected.
29
 The same 
applies, for example, to the different kinds of ammunition which are allowed or forbidden. 
                                                        
29
 Infeld, Danielle L.; Precision-guided munitions demonstrated their pinpoint accuracy in desert 
storm; but is a country obligated to use precision technology to minimize collateral civilian injury and 
damage?; George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics, Vol. 26, 1992, p. 134-
5.This can also be found in the Australian military manual, Australian Defence Force Manual on the 
Law of Armed Conflict, ADFP 37, 1994: „„The existence of precision guided weapons…in a military 




However, the demand to use the most precise means of attack has its contradictions, as this 
obligation would require all the parties to have these so called precise weapons available in 
their arsenals, and this is obviously not the reality, which brings us to another question. 
Knowing that the standards of protection are different, as they depend on the belligerent‟s 
weaponry technological sophistication, it is important to consider the IHL Principle of 
Equality of the parties to a conflict.
30
 So, on the one hand this could cause situations of 
disadvantage among the belligerents, but , on the other hand, and considering that the main 
purpose of IHL is to protect human life (we mean civilian population and objects) from the 
effects of war, as much as possible, “suggesting that a party with the technological ability to 
exercise great care in attack need not do so because its opponent is not similarly equipped 
runs counter to such purposes”.
31
 
The duty of precautions to be taken in attack when feasible recognizes that the 
lawfulness of the attacks will be judged with the help of certain standards of measurement, 
mostly such as technological and economic development of each party.
32
 
In the end, what is to be understood relating the means of warfare, is that whenever a 
state possesses precise weapons in their arsenal and its use is possible in practice, then those 
advanced systems have to be used. But there is no legal duty stating states have to buy the 




                                                                                                                                                              
inventory does not mean that they must necessarily be used in preference to conventional weapons 
even though the latter may cause collateral damage. In many cases, conventional weapons may be 
used to bomb legitimate military targets without violating LOAC [law of armed conflict] requirements. 
It is a command decision as to which weapon to use; this decision will be guided by the basic 
principles of LOAC; military necessity, unnecessary suffering and proportionality‟‟ (para. 834). 
30
 „It seems illogical to presume that the handful of states with precision weapons – such as the United 
States, Britain and, to a lesser degree, Russia – should be held to a higher standard of law‟‟; 
Canestaro, Nathan A.; Legal and Policy Constraints on the Conduct of Aerial Precision Warfare; 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 37, 2004, p. 465. For Yoram Dinstein, „„Such claims 
would introduce an inadmissible discriminatory bias either in favour of, or against, more developed 
belligerent States equipped with expensive ordnance at the cutting edge of modern technology‟‟ (above 
note 25, p. 126). 
31
 Schmitt, Michael N.; The Impact of High and Low-Tech Warfare on the Principle of Distinction; 
Briefing Paper, November 2003, Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard 
University, p. 10. 
32
 Jaworski, Eric; Military Necessity and Civilian Immunity: Where is the Balance?, Chinese Journal of 
International Law, 2003, p. 201. The author notes that the application of relative standards also apply to 
other areas of international law (such as environmental law), so different standards apply according to 
the contracting parties (for example the different timings decided for different countries relating the 
decrease of Co2 emissions. Less developed countries are given more time to reduce its emissions.). 
33
 Above note 31, p. 10. The author contemplates a possibility of determining a state‟s obligation to 
own precision-guided weapons in relation to a percentage of GNP or defense credits. Adding, like we 
stated, that states would probably not accept a legal duty limiting discretion by setting their own 
budgets. 




1.5. The obligation to cancel or suspend an attack if it is likely that it will 
constitute a violation of the Principle of Proportionality, that the objective is 
subject to special protection or that the objective is not a military one 
 
At the first glance, this provision is not innovative as the duties resulting from it are 
provided in other rules of IHL. Furthermore it seems obvious that in case of change in the 
targets qualities or characteristics, which may mean a violation of the rules we mention 
before, the attack gets canceled or suspended. However this rule makes sense if we consider 
the gap of time (and consequently the alteration in the circumstances) that might exist 
between the decision to attack and the execution of that attack, as well as the fact that the 
ones who make the decision of engaging in attack and the ones that execute the attack are not 
the same people. By considering this possibility, this provision tells us, that the demanded 
standard of conduct is applicable at all operational levels.
34
 
This rule sets a personal duty on every member of the armed forces to suspend or 
cancel an attack when it is found out, during the course of operations, information which they 
did not have at the planning time. When, for example, aircrew executing an attack in order to 
destroy what is believed to be a military target, but discover, while flying over the target, that 
the target to be attacked is indeed a protected site (showing a protective emblem),
35
 the pilots 
are then under the obligation of suspending the operations, report to their superiors and 
request for confirmation of the nature of the target before carrying out the attack. With 
today‟s technology, the same applies in case a jetfighter pilot, for example, has already 
dropped precision laser-guided weapons, and notices that the site being attacked is so near to 
civilian houses that it might probably take civilian lives, then the pilot shall remove the 
weapons from the target, choosing to let them explode somewhere, where civilian population 
and objects will not be harmed. 
According to this obligation, an order to attack given by a commander is never 
definite, meaning that soldiers carrying out operations in the field share the responsibility of 
the cautions defined in these Articles Paragraphs and therefore cannot avoid responsibility for 
wrongful acts violating the law by just stating they were following orders. 
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Relating the proportionality of the attack, let‟s say in a big military operation, it‟s 
impossible to ask every soldier taking part in it (tank drivers, pilots, and others)to measure the 
military advantage expected from the operation against collateral causalities and damage that 
may result of the attack, for at least logistical reasons. In a case such as this, the 
proportionality has to be calculated based on the attack as a whole. However, in certain 
circumstances, the attack seen as a whole may be in accordance with the proportionality 
requirements and still some of the soldiers may consider their action to be out of 
proportionality boundaries, but in such case, criminal responsibility will fall on the ones who 
decided and gave the orders to attack, according to Article 85/3 of ADI.
36
 
But, and having as basis Article 57/2, in case soldiers carrying out an attack verify that an 
incorrect judgment has been made in relation to the targets nature, or new circumstances and 
information completely change the circumstances under which the decision to attack has been 
made, then forcing the soldiers to obey the commands received from their commanders would 
be contrary to the aim and letter of this rule. So, if facing such a situation, the soldier has to 
assume its commanders have made a mistake as far as the judgment of the rule of 
proportionality is concerned, or that they had incorrect/inaccurate information relating the site 
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1.6. The obligation to choose the military objective involving the minimal danger 
to civilian lives and civilian objects 
 
According to the New Delhi Draft Rules of 1956, more precisely Article 8/a, 2, 
whenever several objectives can be chosen, to get a specific military advantage, the deciding 
authority has to choose the one that represents the minimal danger to civilian population. It 
might seem that this provision is in fact a recommendation rather than an obligation, as all 
military objectives are (in a normal scenario) legitimate targets,
37
 however, the rule set in 
Article 57/3 extends its scope to civilian objects (when comparing to the New Delhi rule) and 
constitutes a binding legal obligation, having been established in several military manuals.
38
 
A clear example as a situation where this rule applies is when a military authority has to 
decide between attacking a telephone or attacking its transmission lines (assuming they are 
located far from civilians and civilian objects). The decision-making body should in this case 
choose to attack the transmission lines (once again assuming similar military advantage 
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1.7. The obligation of warning before an upcoming attack that may affect the 
civilian population 
 
This obligation was first set forth in Article 19 of the Lieber Code, requiring that the 
enemy is to be informed „„of their intention to bombard a place, so that the non-combatants, 
and especially the women and children, may be removed before the bombardment 
commences‟‟. Of course, years ago, this represented no loss in military advantage as the only 
bombings were made by artillery and so, there was no value in the element of surprise, as 
there was no possibility of protecting the military objectives from being attacked. So, on the 
side of the attacker, this rule made sense years ago, but not anymore, due to evolution of 
warfare such as aerial bombardment, in which the element of surprise plays an important 
role,
40
 many times making the difference between winning or losing (especially because of 
modern anti-aircraft defenses). 
But the fact is that this rule survived the evolution and reached our modern codifications.
41
 
Nevertheless, and admitting this was and still is a very important precaution in attack 
(allowing to save many human lives), this rule is not absolute. And the reason for that is that 
it is not possible to destroy or seriously compromise the chances of success of a military 
operation based on this rule. That is why ADI states that a warning is to be given “unless 




One question remains. Is it enough to give an “abstract” warning (consisting normally 
of a list of sites considered by the enemy as lawful military objectives)? The answer is unclear 
at this point. However it is sure that a belligerent is not obliged to issue several warnings of 
the danger resulting from the proximity to a clearly defined military objective. So after the 
general warning at the beginning of hostilities, and a repetition of that during the war, will 
comply with the spirit and duty set forth in this rule.
43
 There are obviously specific rules 
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relating when and how the warnings should be given, and even more logical, the warnings 
cannot be given too much in advance, as they might then (after some time) not be 
considerable plausible anymore, or too late, as the population needs a certain amount of time 
in order to evacuate.
44
 Of course, and considering this rule is or might be a big help in 
respecting the precautions in attack and one of the most important targets of IHL, the fact that 
a party to a conflict complies with this rule, does not exempt that same party of obeying the 
other precautions en attack, under the risk, that doing so, would be incoherent with the 
general PD as the whole of Article 57. 
The Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon confirmed this unequivocally: 
“Obligations with respect to the PD and the conduct of hostilities remain applicable 
even if civilians remain in the zone of operations after a warning has been given …. 
A warning to evacuate does not relieve the military of their ongoing obligation to take 





It is (at least nowadays) accepted that Human Rights Law and IHL share some of the 
same core objectives and ideas, culminating in the protection and dignity of human life.
46
 
 It is also generally accepted that IHL and Human Rights Law are complementary legal 
regimes, albeit with a different scope of application. While human rights law is deemed to 
apply at all times (and thus constitutes the lex generalis), the application of IHL is triggered 






                                                                                                                                                              
Second World War used to do, flying at very low altitudes over the targets before attacking, so that 
civilians had time to protect themselves. 
44
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Chapter 3 – New Technologies and Warfare 
 
 
§ 1 Short note on New Technologies and Warfare 
  
 We don‟t question the fact that IHL applies to modern warfare and technology, as the 
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I suggests. However, for example the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons from 1980
48
 did not predict the use of unmanned aircraft as a 
weapon of war, thus is known that the use of Autonomous Weapon Systems is increasing in 
today‟s armed conflicts, bringing with it serious moral, ethical and legal issues. 
Insofar applying rules that were thought and created years before the last 
technological developments in the war industry, and that did not on one side predict such 
developments in war technology and on the other side predict the configuration of battlefield 
we have today (we mean the increasing distance of soldiers from the field of battle by being 
substituted by machines), might have as consequence that those rules are not clear enough in 
order to be correctly interpreted in the context of the specific technological characteristics of 
today‟s weaponry technology, resulting in a misinterpretation regarding the predictable 
humanitarian impact this might have. The resulting uncertainty as to the applicable legal 
standards, in conjunction with the rapid development and proliferation of drone and robotic 
technology and the perceived lack of transparency and accountability in current policies, has 
the potential of polarizing the international community, undermining the rule of law and, 
ultimately, of destabilizing the international security environment as a whole. In the end, and 
considering that the existing law did and could not predict the use of weaponry with the 
technology available today, there are 2 options. Either we adapt the interpretation of the 
existing law by applying its principles, or new law has to be created in order to specifically 
regulate the advances in technology. For the time being, the first option makes more sense, as 
creating a new set of rules to apply to a specific technology that develops and changes 
extremely fast would be an utopic task from the regulator point of view. 
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Drones are a specific type of unmanned robot, namely unmanned aerial vehicles that 
were first used for reconnaissance and surveillance purposes and later started being used as 
attack machines, having now a strike role as semi-autonomous weapons.
49
 
Robotic weapons, in which “unmanned combat aerial vehicles” (armed drones) are included, 
can be divided into three basic categories, depending on the degree of direct control exercised 
by a human operator.  
First the most simple machines, the Human controlled (“human-in-the-loop”) 
systems: machines which are remotely controlled by a human operator. While such robots 
may be able to independently perform selected tasks delegated to them by their operator (such 
as navigation, systems control, target detection, and weapons guidance), they cannot attack 
without the real time command of their human operator.  
The second category of robots are the Human supervised (“human-on-the-loop”) systems: 
Robotic weapons which can carry out a targeting process independently from human 
command, but which remain under the real-time supervision of a human operator who can 
override any decision to attack.  
And the most complex category, the Autonomous (“human-out-of-the-loop”) systems: 
Robotic weapons which can search, identify, select, and attack targets without real time 
control by a human operator. Such weapon systems can be described as “automated” when 
their capability to autonomously detect and attack targets is confined to a comparatively 
restricted, predefined and controlled environment. When they are capable of autonomously 
performing these tasks in an open and unpredictable environment they are described as “fully 
autonomous”. This small explanation of the three types of systems represents in a way the 
chronological timeline the world has been assisting relating the development of technology in 




 We will provide in-depth legal distinction between the consequences of the use of the 
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1. The Military Use of Drones, brief contextualization 
 
It is common sense that in many situations it is difficult for ground forces to obtain 
accurate intelligence in the fuss of the battle. The same is valid for jet fighter planes, as they 
might not be able to fly at low altitudes due to the high risk of being shot down. 
It is proven that Drones are able to provide the military with accurate information and 
are optimized for aerial surveillance, reason why they started being used on a regular basis. 
With the technology they possess, the military is able to receive accurate information on a 
given target possibility, making it possible for the decision makers to conduct an analysis 
with knowledge of the context in which the attack will take place, the site and its 
surroundings, being then able to ask themselves the questions that need to be answered in 
order to comply with the rules of necessity, proportionality, distinction and precaution before 
deciding to attack or not, depending on the answers result of those questions. 
With the information provided by the Drones, it is possible to distinguish between civilians 
and belligerents, as well as understanding the geographic situation of the target and its 
surroundings, in order to understand the proximity of civilians and civilian objects. These 
machines provide crucial intelligence that allows the responsible people to make an informed 
and carefully thought decision, in the light of the mandatory standard of conduct
51
 that has to 
be respected in order for an attack to be legal. 
52
 So Drones enhance the ability of military 
forces to undertake precautions in attack.
53
 All this should be taken in account when 
establishing which foreseeable consequences may result from the attack in terms of collateral 
damage. After these considerations, the deciding commander should analyze if the military 
advantage achieved with the attack is worth the foreseeable loss of human life and patrimony, 
from a human, legal and ethical point of view. However, it is also a fact that the physical 
distance that separates the location which is under Drone surveillance and the location from 
where the Drone is being controlled by an operation team, sometimes, thousands of miles 
away and the lack of notion of the Drone operating team of the real environment of the 
location that will be subject to an attack, of which the only knowledge they have is through 
their live video and audio feeds
54
, is most certainly an intelligence disadvantage, which may 
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in certain cases  lead to decisions based on wrong impressions or even make targeting easier 
and abuses more likely. The States have the responsibility to provide training programs for 
drone operators who have never been faced with the reality of a battlefield panorama, subject 
to the risks of fighting a war in first person, in order to teach them respect for IHL and 
respective safeguards for compliance with its rules and limits. 
  In relation to the growing distance between the soldiers and the battlefields and to the 
asymmetry it creates between those parties with financial resources to have this kind of 
technology and thus keep the men out of danger, and the belligerents that still fight their wars 
in a more classical way. Anyway, as morbid as it might seem, it is in our opinion important 
that the ones conducting an attack are able to see the results of their actions “with their own 
eyes”, hopefully gaining awareness over their actions, by seeing the direct influence of their 
actions in other human beings lives. At this point we have to ask ourselves one question. The 
soldiers conducting the attack are (generally) not the ones that decide to attack. Deciding 
level staff is generally not close to the “frontline” where all action takes place and as we 
mentioned before the trend is, not only staff with commanding roles, but gradually every 
soldier is taken away from the field of battle. So it is only natural that the soldiers conducting 
an attack in the field or behind the controls of a drone, by following superior orders have 
themselves the obligation of respecting and re-evaluating the situation in light of the rules of 
IHL, by suspending an attack and therefore maybe even acting against the orders of a 
superior. Nevertheless, they are obliged to do so in accordance with IHL, and by not doing it, 
apart from the responsibility of the deciding commander, they may also incur in individual 
international responsibility in light of IHL rules. All these consequences are a possibility 
when it becomes proven that the rules of distinction, proportionality (and therefore 
necessarily necessity and military advantage) and feasible precautions in attack have not been 
respected, having resulted in the killing of civilians other than the lawful target, which would 
be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life under Human Rights Law and could result as 
mentioned above, in individual criminal liability
55
. 
Going back to the point referred to before, relating the displacement of the soldiers from the 
field of battle, the use of drones it is of great concern in the sense that these machines make it 
                                                                                                                                                              
of human life, is no longer seen with the seriousness and reality it should be seen with. This makes us 
assume, that this lack of reality in the conduction of armed attacks will develop in a progressive 
disrespect of the rules of distinction, necessity, precaution and especially proportionality. 
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easier to kill without risk to a State„s forces
56
, and so, policy makers and commanders will be 
tempted to interpret the legal limitations on who can be killed, and under what circumstances, 
too expansively. States must ensure that the criteria they apply to determine who, what, where 
and when can be targeted, meaning, what is a lawful attack. The rules that have to be 
followed before and during an attack do not change according to the chosen weapon, but 
instead the weapon can choose according to the target and the weapons availability (for 
example choosing a weapon with greater precision capability).
57
 However the demanded 
caution demanded from the deciding officer and later from the soldiers pursuing the attack, 
has to be present at all times. And considering the fact that a drone is not able to choose the 
target, activate and fire its weapons, these steps that lead into the fulfillment of an attack will 
be taken by a man, which means that in the end, from a legal standpoint, the use of a weapon 
fired from a unmanned aerial vehicle versus one fired from some remote platform with a 
human pilot makes no difference in battle (we repeat, as long as the drone is controlled by a 
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2. Does the Military use of Drones observe the standard of conduct 
introduced by the Principle of Precaution? 
 
 
It is true that IHL places limits on the weapons States may use, and weapons that are 
prohibited (such as biological weapons).
59
 However, like we stated before, a missile fired 
from a drone is no different from any other commonly used weapon, including a gun fired by 
a soldier or a helicopter or gunship that fires missiles or even a jet fighter that fires a laser 
guided missile. The difference lies on whether the plane has a pilot inside it or not. 
60
A Drone, 
as we know, doesn„t have any pilot inside it, but it works as a normal F-14. So the question 
here is not what a Drone does, but instead, how it does it. The critical legal question is: 
whether its specific use complies with IHL by respecting its core “values” such as the respect 
for distinction, proportionality, and precaution. 
Obviously, any weapon system can deliberately be used in a manner violating humanitarian 
law. It is therefore important to distinguish the legality of a weapon system as such (law of 
weaponry) from the legality of the way it is being used in a particular operation (law of 
targeting). The present question of the legality of a weapon system as such turns on whether, 
in the normal operational circumstances for which it has been designed, that system is capable 
of being used in compliance with humanitarian law. This determination has either already 
been made in the framework of existing treaties prohibiting or regulating specific weapon 
systems, or it must be made based on the fundamental principles governing the lawfulness of 
weapons under humanitarian law.
61
 
In recent years, due to the use of drones and other unmanned robots in combat 
scenarios, situations of extreme violence and suffering have increased exponentially, and 
States continue to invest significantly into increasing the operational autonomy of such 
systems. Although the legal principles resulting from these normative frameworks are 
universally recognized, their precise application and interpretation with regard to the use of 
armed drones and other robotic weapons gives rise to a number of controversies. Some of 
these controversies relate to the lawfulness of robotic weapons technology as such, whereas 
others relate to the circumstances and manner in which such technology is being used in 
current State practice and this question should be taken in account in the use of any kind of 
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weapon. It is not enough that a deciding commander asks the questions predicted in Article 57 
of API relating distinction, proportionality (and therefore necessarily evaluating necessity and 
military advantage) and precaution, but he has to provide the answers that in the eyes of the 
law allow him to proceed with the attack.  
As said above, if we consider the fact that drones have outstanding surveillance capability and 
greater precision when compared to other weapons, in theory they can better prevent 
collateral damage and loss of life. There is no doubt that these machines possess a technology 
that allows its users to direct their attacks more precisely against military objectives and so 
reducing loss of civilian life and damage to civilian objects. However, when looking at the 
use of drones as weapons of attack and no longer just surveillance machines, the fact is that 
the precision, accuracy and legality of the strike will depend on the human intelligence upon 
which the targeting decision is based.
62
  
On the other hand the questions that we mentioned before absolutely have to be asked and 
answered if the attack is to be made in accordance with the law.
63
 The norms that rule the 
attack are a mandatory standard of conduct which any military decision maker has to follow 
before giving the order to attack and not just a mere recommendation, under the assumption 
that any attack will obey these rules. Moreover, it is established that this rule is a norm of 
customary international law.  
In practical terms this set of rules is divided in two levels. On one hand, the so called 
objective side of this principle, according to which some questions relating the attack have to 
be asked and answered, and on the other hand a more subjective side which means when 
analyzing proportionality, for example, the military decision maker ordering the attack must 
subjectively evaluate whether the expected collateral damage is excessive in relation to the 
anticipated military advantage to be gained. These subjective judgements must be made 
regarding whether all feasible precautions have indeed been taken.
64
 The extent to which 
precautions in attack are “feasible” depends on factors such as the availability of intelligence 
on the target and its surroundings, the level of control exercised over the territory, the choice 
and sophistication of available weapons, the urgency of the attack and the security risks 
which additional precautionary measures may entail for the attacking forces or the civilian 
population.
65
 When all feasible precautionary measures have been taken and doubt persists as 
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to the status or activities of the targeted persons or of bystanders, they must be presumed to be 
protected against direct attack.
66
 If drone attacks are to have any chance of success, they must 
be planned and organized with pin-point accuracy and based on excellent intelligence. 
Compared to many types of more traditional military operations, targeted drone attacks have 
very little tolerance for improvisation, and even minor unexpected events may lead to failure, 
erroneous targeting or excessive incidental harm. Decisions to carry out a drone attack are not 
typically taken under the time pressure and personal stress of immediate combat operations, 
but targeted sites are often watched and analyzed for several days or weeks before being 
attacked. In many circumstances, the long loiter capacity of drone may significantly extend 
the period at the disposal of operators to verify targets, assess the likelihood of collateral harm 
and clarify other factors before taking the decision to attack. As a general rule, the context of 
targeted killing through drone-attacks allows - and therefore also requires - a particularly high 
level of precaution.
67
 Nevertheless, the often difficult circumstances of armed conflict also 
require a degree of tolerance for errors made “within the limits of honest judgment on the 
basis of the conditions prevailing at the time”.101 In no case, however, does the law of 
hostilities permit the targeting of individuals based on the mere suspicion that they may 
qualify as a legitimate military target, such as appears to be the case with the current US 
policy of “signature strikes”. The distinctive criterion between “mere suspicion” and 
erroneous “honest judgment” is not only the degree of subjective conviction or doubt held by 
the responsible State agent, but also the objective reasonableness of that subjective conviction 
in view of the circumstances prevailing at the time.
68
  
The integration of this set of rules in the national military manuals is of the utmost importance 
in order to make this principle and its rules better known to the ones that have to apply and 
respect them in the end, the military staff. No matter the influence politics and politicians may 
have in the conduct and decisions that lead to wars and attacks, the ones that possess 
responsibility in the last instance, the ones that “pull the trigger”, are and will continue being 
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Public Committee Against Torture et al. v. The Government of Israel et al. (HCJ 769/02), Judgment of 
13 December 2006, § 40). 
68
 Above note 50, p. 23-24. 




the soldiers. On the other hand, a military manual should demystify the set of IHL rules, as 
they are often too general to be used as a guide for practical behaviors in combat. 
Furthermore, the abstract notions of a rule of IHL can be set aside in a military manual, by 
relating the international regulations to the practical situations in which the military finds 
itself and to the context and capacities of their units. 
The manuals should not simply paraphrase the law, but give clear and practical instructions 
on how to respect the law by providing guidance in a realistic and practical way. The UK 
manual is a good example of what we mean by realistic and practical guidance, as it addresses 
existing policies and draws consequences from them. In the case of the precautions in attack, 
the manual has a veritable checklist for consultation during target selection by a commander 
in his efforts to comply with the “legal obligation to do everything feasible to verify that the 
proposed target is not protected from an attack”
69
: 
1. whether he can personally verify the target; 
2. instructions from higher authority about objects which are not to be targeted; 
3. intelligence reports, aerial or satellite reconnaissance pictures, and any other 
information in his possession about the nature of the proposed target; 
4. any rules of engagement imposed by higher authority under which he is required to 
operate; 
5. the risks to his own forces necessitated by target verification. 
 
It has been noted that challenges to the responsible operation of such a system include the 
limited capacity of an operator to process a large volume of data, including contradictory data 
at a given time ("information overload"), and the supervision of more than one such system at 
a time, leading to questions about the operator„s ability to fully comply with the relevant rules 
of IHL in those circumstances. Armed drones pose a major threat to the general prohibition 
on the inter-state use of force and to respect for human rights. On the battlefield, in a situation 
of armed conflict, the use of armed drones may be able to satisfy the fundamental IHL rules 
of distinction and proportionality (although attributing international criminal responsibility 
for their unlawful use may prove a significant challenge). Away from the battlefield, the use 
of drone strikes will often amount the violation of fundamental human rights. Greater clarity 
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on the applicable legal regime along with restraints to prevent the further autonomization of 
drone technology is urgently needed.
70
 
For the time being, no currently operational drone can reliably distinguish between 
legitimate military targets and civilian persons and objects, take precautions to avoid 
erroneous targeting, or assess the proportionality of expected collateral civilian harm. In order 
to become fully autonomous robots, drones would have to be equipped with highly accurate 
and discriminative sensing and vision systems capable of reliably identifying intended targets 
based on very limited and often misleading information. Moreover, a fully autonomous 
drone-robot would need “situational awareness” (artificial intelligence) enabling it to evaluate 
an extremely complex set of unpredictable circumstances and, through independent 
reasoning, come to an appropriate conclusion in line with its mission goals, applicable law 
and underlying military and humanitarian values. As has been pointed out, such fully 
autonomous robotic systems belong to the realm of “hope ware” rather than software and, 
save for a technological quantum leap, are unlikely to become reality for several decades to 
come.
71
 Even intermediate human-supervised systems, in which autonomous targeting 
decisions taken by drones can be overridden by a human controller (“man on the loop”), can 
be problematic in practice. First, the technological challenges to autonomous target 
identification and selection are essentially the same and, second, such systems generally 
require the human controller to decide within a few seconds or less on the appropriateness of 
an extremely complex robotic targeting decision without being able to sufficiently review, 
process and understand the underlying data. In any case, for the foreseeable future, the lawful 
application of military force through armed drones will always require the direct involvement 
of a human controller.
72
 
Technological means to reduce civilian loss of life exist and are being used by a growing 
number of States. But are the rules of distinction, proportionality, necessity and precaution 
being observed? The question of the increasing asymmetry in the wars being fought also 
plays a key role in the growing number of civilian casualties. As more and more States 
possess and use drone technology, and on the other side, non-State actors do not have such 
weapon systems, the strategy, of the weaker armed parties has to change as they can no longer 
“hit” the forces of the other side who are increasingly being removed from the field of battle. 
The strategy being adopted by the weaker belligerent is the one we can see nowadays in the 
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media. They bring the fights to urban areas, avoiding direct confrontation in open spaces, and 




































It is the general opinion, with which we agree, that modern warfare, such as precision-guided 
attacks are a step forward in avoiding the harm to civilian population and objects. Although 
the progress in law is typically slower than the advances in weaponry technology, efforts 
should be made to act within the limits of the law by applying its principles to the reality of 
current means and methods of combat. This is a positive trend, as long as those interpretations 
do not ignore the realities of military necessity. 
However, in order for IHL to be respected by those who are affected by it, it‟s important that, 
exaggerated expectations are not created allowing unreasonable demands on the armed forces. 
Insofar a balance between humanitarian causes and military necessity has to continue being 
seen as an International Law concern. 
Furthermore IHL has to be sensible to the fact that precision weaponry is not the same for the 
parties participating in armed conflicts, and as a result of this fact, the weaker equipped 
belligerent may try to compensate his disadvantages with methods (brutal ones in some cases) 
that violate the pillars of IHL. The law doesn‟t force the parties to acquire the latest 
technology, but does instead demand that the parties with access to technology that allows the 
attack to be more precise in order to spare innocent people lives, uses the available 
technology. On the other hand parties that do not have access to that kind of technologically 
advanced weaponry might try to get an exemption based on their limited power.
73
 
Without any doubt, from a technological point of view, attacks by human controlled drones 
(“man in the loop”) can be directed at specific military objectives and, in principle, the effects 
of such attacks on the target and the civilian population can be limited as required by 
humanitarian law. Therefore, currently operational armed drones do not, as such, constitute an 
indiscriminate mean of warfare prohibited under humanitarian law.
74
 Civilians and civilian 
objects that are attacked by armed drones, or when there is an attack resulting in excessive 
collateral damage towards civilians, this violation is not caused by technology malfunction or 
inability of drones to be used in respect for the law, instead due to military staff or drone 
operators that did not comply with the rules of distinction, proportionality and precaution. So 
it is a disrespect of law of targeting and not of the law that regulates weaponry.
75
  
                                                        
73
 Above note 53, p. 453 ff. 
74
 Alston, Philip; The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders, New York University School of Law 
September 2011, p. 324 (http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Vol.-2_Alston1.pdf) 
75
 Boothby, William H.; The Law of Targeting; Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 281 




In the case of fully autonomous armed drones (human-out-of-the-loop”) in which the 
machines themselves have decisive power without intervention of operators, the conclusion is 
different. 
 Currently no war robot has the technology allowing it to distinguish between military 
targets and innocent civilians, taking the needed precautions in order not to attack wrong 
targets, and especially the capacity of calculating the proportionality of the military advantage 
versus expected collateral damage. Even in a situation where the battlefield is for example the 
sea or desert, where there are no civilians, the war robot is not capable of distinguishing 
medical staff and prisoners of war, both protected by law, from other lawful targetable 
military personnel. 
So a fully autonomous drone, under their current technological capabilities is unable to 
comply with the law of targeting and would therefore be an indiscriminate weapon, forbidden 
under IHL. 
 It is known that weaponry industry will never stop developing and the law governing 
its use must “tag along” with these developments and at some point create human, ethical and 
moral barriers. Other ways, with the predictable technological advance in the industry of war, 
if limits are not raised, we face the risk of going backwards in the path of evolution (de-
evolution), to the point where battles were fought with no rules to limit them
76
 where the shed 
of blood was seen as nothing but a normal consequence, and where there was no place for 
humanity, dignity and value for human life. Therefore, the rules applying to armed conflict 
will or should be developed based of course on the same principles applying today, at some 
point, as the way wars are being fought will never be the same and the means and methods of 
combat will never stop developing. 
But we suppose this development will not be enough to humanize armed conflicts. Rules 
without consequences, for the ones breaking it remain but a dead letter – a simple theoretical 
exercise. The rules have to be respected, and so, the biggest challenge that IHL faces at this 
point and in coming time, is the implementation of these rules. And that is why individual 
responsibility plays such an important role. 
We don‟t question the fact that it is important to act on a diplomatic level. But now 
more than ever, the respect for the rules of war depend on the actions of each individual with 
a role in the conflict, from those in the top of the chain of command, to the ones fighting on 
the battlefield. 
As is known, the Geneva Conventions require the States to prosecute offenders, no 
matter their nationality or the place where they committed the offences. These rules have to 
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be followed and put in practice so that in the future there will be no place where war criminals 
can hide from the hand of justice. The instrument of individual responsibility plays a 
significant role in the education of respect for human life by those enrolling in an armed 
conflict. 
 As a matter of curiosity, rules of distinction, precaution and proportionality do not 
establish a theoretical separation of the precautions that have to be respected by the parties to 
a conflict. Both the attacking and the defending party have to respect and protect as best as 
possible human life and civilian objects. The existing separation is just a practical one which 
ultimately leads to a common end, the protection of those not participating or no longer 
participating in the combat. 
Following this line of though, and knowing that the defender also has its share and 
responsibility in the application of the above mentioned rules, namely in evacuating civilian 
population from the vicinity of possible military targets, we arrive to the conclusion that the 
responsibility for application of the precautionary rules at war rest on the shoulders of all 
those participating in the conflict and consequently, it seems obvious that neither the attacker, 
nor the defender may exempt themselves of the responsibility to protect, by stating that its 
opposition did not respect these rules of IHL. This means that the respect of these obligations 
by one of the belligerents does not depend on the conduct of the other party of the conflict.
77
  
We face a shared responsibility, from which the parties cannot free themselves by the mere 
disrespect towards these rules from the other side. In practical terms, what this means is that if 
the defender fails to evacuate the civilians from the vicinity of a military objective, the 
attacker will still have to consider in the pre attacking judgment and application of the rules of 
proportionality and take the necessary precautions.
78
 However the defender will fall under the 
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In order to bring to an end our considerations relating the use of fully autonomous 
war robots, we do don‟t think that these machines can operate according to the rules of IHL 
and even Human Rights Law. Apart from the fact that a machine is not capable of having the 
human subjectivity to analyze, case-by-case, if an attack is in accordance with the rules of 
proportionality, precaution and distinction, as it lacks the human nature needed to consider 
such legal, moral and ethical considerations. And we do not believe that some form of 
extraordinarily developed artificial intelligence (is not wrong to say at a human level) will be 
achieved in a foreseeable future. 
Furthermore, another question arises. In case of a breach of the rules of armed conflict who 
will be facing individual responsibility? Moreover, if the responsibility cannot be determined 
in accordance to the rules of IHL and Human Rights Law, won‟t it be a breach in the law, 
human dignity and ethics to use such technologies? And is it acceptable, from a moral point 
of view to delegate the power of tacking lives to any kind of machine? 
 In our opinion, the use of this kind of technology cannot possibly happen in respect of 
the law. A machine lacks human reasoning, ethical and moral principles as well as the notion 
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